Friday, October 20, 2023

GTR 1890 Lachine Wharf Verdict, The Three Solitudes of the Coroner's Jury


Drunk?

Asleep at the switch?

Rules which are not enforced?

Failure to properly employ the telegraph system?

Not maintaining a proper watch on the road ahead?


An early, undated postcard. The switch in the foreground may be for a local commercial track.
from: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec


Here are the previous posts on this accident and the coroner's jury.

Part 1

Part 2


A quick review:

Below is an artist's work to illustrate the circumstances of the accident. The engine of the 6-hour-late Toronto Express is submerged in the St Lawrence River and the baggage car is teetering at the end of the Lachine Wharf. The body of the engineer (the only fatality) was recovered before the inquest began. The tender had been pulled up through the ice - according to newspaper reports. There was the expectation that the engine would also be removed before the winter ice locked it in.

On the inset diagram, B marks the location of Willows. Here there was a switchman's shanty with a telegraph set. As already noted in Part 2, trains to Lachine were fairly frequent during the day. There was not just one "Lachine Train" which ran first thing in the morning.

Not shown are two manually-set (switch protection) semaphores which could be seen at a greater distance than the Lachine Wharf spur switch target. These would be set by the switchman to control traffic on the south track ... for example, if the switch was open, or if a train was occupying the south main track at Willows.

In the same December 1890's newspapers, I was noticing reports regarding one or two other passenger train accidents over on the Intercolonial. One accident killed 5, with 3 others dying later of their injuries. Back then, accidents, loss of life and investigations of railway accidents by coroner's juries were quite common. Wooden passenger cars derailing at track speed from a broken wheel ... and slamming into bridge abutments ... make the Lachine accident seem minor at this point in history. 

from: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec

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from: Archives historiques de la Ville de Montréal

Shown above is a composite made from a few 'stereo pairs' of Montreal, taken by a commercial service in 1947. By this time, the Lachine Wharf station had been removed. Stereo pairs are not designed to fit together exactly, so my composite looks a little rough.

  • At the extreme left, just beyond the Lombardi poplars, on the CNR (ex-GTR) double-track main line you can see Lachine station (built in 1888). It played no role in this accident.

  • Following the tracks to the right (east) you can approximate where the Lachine Wharf spur leaves the main line at the switch (employee timetable 'station') named Willows. The switchman and his shanty were located here.
  • Farther to the east - at the right edge of the photo - is Convent. This passenger station is mentioned in the accounts below, because trains passing it can be seen from Willows.
  • The Lachine Wharf station was located near the circular pile of material seen to the west of the spur. It is significant because it provided the first indication to the Toronto Express engine crew - operating in the winter morning darkness, in a snowstorm - that their train had departed from the main line. The gentle left-hand curvature of the spur was apparently not noticed by the engine crew as their engine forced its pilot through the fallen snow. The Toronto Express was the first westbound released into the storm - six hours after the Bonaventure station collision blocked their departure. 
  • You can see the area where the wye was located ... to turn the Lachine train for its return to Bonaventure station, Montreal.

  • The Lachine Wharf was used during the summer months as a centre for providing steamboat rides down the Lachine Rapids ... and west to St Anne's at the western tip of Montreal Island.
  • To the north of the Lachine station, at the left edge of the photo, is an oval with an irregular loop around it. These were elevated miniature tracks where builders of miniature live steam locomotives could operate their creations. They still existed in the early 1960s.

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Once again, a point form summary of the newspaper articles precedes the clippings.

This is being done so you don't have to plow through the difficult-to-read originals.

However, if there are points which interest you, the original artifacts are here for you to read.

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  • Coroner Jones states to the newspaper reporter that his own mind is made up regarding who was to blame for the death of Engineer Birse. However, it is up to the jury to decide on this matter.
  • A juror says that the engineer of the regular Lachine train should be called and another says the jury should see the location of the event.
  • General Superintendent J Stevenson of the GTR testifies that a light engine collided with an outbound freight at the Bonaventure terminal, and this caused the delay of the Toronto Express.
  • The movement of trains is reported on the telegraph [OS'd to the dispatcher on the common circuit] and operators can be aware of the trains which are approaching their stations. In contrast, in England, electrically-triggered block signals provide protection behind a train - actuated by the train's passing. The protection remains until that train leaves the block. 
  • General Superintendent Stevenson says that the dispatcher notifies the Lachine Junction operator (2 miles west of Bonaventure) by a bell when a train leaves Bonaventure station. 
  • Stevenson has conducted his own inquiries. The switchman was asleep at his post. The engineer was not keeping a proper lookout. Their gross neglect of their duty caused the accident.


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  • General Superintendent Stevenson indicated that the switchman was tasked with the safe passage of trains by his switch - he was asleep. The engineer was responsible for the safety of his passenger train. By the testimony of the fireman, the semaphore and switch light could have been seen from the cab. The engineer did not constantly verify the indication of the switch light before passing over the switch - in violation of the rules.
  • A hand lamp for signalling and a telegraph key and sounder are present at the Willows location. Although the switchman knows Morse, it was not his duty to listen for the OS reports on passing trains.
  • Engineer Samuel Birckley had been with the Grand Trunk for 17 years and he was the engineer of the Lachine (local) Train. His train was delayed because of the light engine/freight collision at Bonaventure. His Lachine Train was the second westbound released - following the Toronto Express by about 15 minutes. 
  • Engineer Birckley said it was necessary to whistle (4 sounds - per the rules) TWICE for the switch at Willows (leading to the Lachine Wharf spur) ... as the switch was not attended to after the first whistle.
  • The switchman opened the switch to allow the Lachine Train onto the Lachine Wharf spur. There Birckley's train came upon the markers of the Toronto Express and was told about the accident by its crew.
  • Engineer Birckley continued that he usually whistled for the switch at Willows, but as the switchman could see him leave Convent, 140 yards away the switchman frequently set the switch for him without the Lachine Train needing to signal for it. The switchman was always ready for duty and never failed to set the switch when he whistled.
  • Engineer Birckley of the Lachine Train testified that the switch should always be set for the main track, and rules were being broken when it was set for him without whistling, however he never felt the need to report this. On Joe Birse's engine [the Toronto Express] you could not keep your hand on the throttle all the time and also see the switch indications.
  • [On the morning of the accident] Birckley whistled at 4 engine lengths, then 2 engine lengths before the switchman came out to open the switch for the Lachine Wharf spur [on which the Toronto Express already had crashed].
  • Due to the curvature, the engineer of the Toronto Express would need to cross to the fireman's side to see the purple [diverging] switch light continuously as the train approached. It would take about 30 seconds for the Express to travel between the switch at Willows and the Lachine Wharf [down the length of the spur and down into the water]. It was usual for a switchman to use the coloured hand signal lamp at night, but Switchman Dubois did not that night.
  • Engineer David Simpson of the Brockville Train said that after the engine of the Express passed the [manual approach] semaphore indicating 'all right' [at the Lachine Wharf switch] ... that Switchman Dubois could have had time to throw the switch in front of the Toronto Express for the Lachine Wharf spur. 
  • The switch target could not have been seen by the engineer around the smokestack and height of the engine for the last 40 feet before the switch. Engineer Simpson always slowed up at this switch for this reason and waited until he had safely passed by it before he 'let her out' ['highballed']. The engineer could not maintain his proper place on the right side of the cab - with his hands on the throttle and brake - and check for the switch target light on the left side at the same time. 
    • [Just for the sake of summarizing all of this evidence: Edwards, the Toronto Express fireman, had already testified that they were in a snowstorm and the pilot flangers were down - kicking up snow. They would have had the usual smoke and steam swirling around. So, amidst all this, the General Superintendent of the Grand Trunk, J. Stevenson (above) thought that Engineer Birse of the Express should have crossed the cab ... to keep an eagle eye for a potential purple switch target ... for the last 40 feet before reaching the points ... in order to be certain ... that the switch wasn't suddenly thrown in his face. While this speaks to improving 'cab resource management' ... getting the fireman to look ... it does not seem reasonable to blame the engineer for failing to maintain a proper lookout.]


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 A view published in 1909. You can see a locomotive on the spur ...  to the left of the houses.
from: from: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec


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  • The Grand Trunk provided a train and Coroner Jones, the jury and two railway officials visited Willows (the location of the switch) and the stop blocks beyond the Lachine Wharf station, where the engine entered the St Lawrence River.
  • Question: Is it possible Engineer Birse saw the [approach] semaphore for eastbounds and mistook it for the semaphore protecting the Willows switch? Answer: This is unlikely with Birse's years of experience. It is more likely that he saw the switch target displaying a clear [white] light and that this target was changed at the last minute to the purple light indicating a diverging route had been set by the switchman.
  • French-Canadian jurors: 1) Birse should have got down from his engine to examine the switch. 2) Birse must have been drunk. 3) How can you (said to Juror James R Dick) say that Switchman Dubois was asleep but I can't say Birse was drunk? Dick answers: There is no evidence that Birse was drunk, however Grand Trunk General Superintendent Stevenson gave sworn evidence that Dubois was asleep.
  • There was discussion about the curvature of the main line and the curvature of the spur and whether it would have given any obvious sign to the engineer that he was on the wrong track. 
  • The acting switchman at Willows was asked to switch the points - which took about one second. A juror pointed out that with the snowstorm filling in the points, this act may have taken longer. [I wonder if stub switches, built with the light rail of the era, were hard to turn in a snowstorm.]
  • A juror asked a GTR official present: If the train had entered the spur at 40 mph, could it stop in time before hitting the stop blocks. Answer: Yes.
  • After returning to Montreal: the coroner recommended the jurors choose 3 [anglophones] and 3 [francophones] to draw up a memorandum of the evidence. This memorandum would be discussed on the following day.


*  *  *
  • The subcommittee of 6 jurors found that Switchman Dubois was guilty of culpable negligence in turning the switch for the Lachine Wharf spur whereby the engine was thrown into the river and Engineer Birse was killed. Birse evidently saw a white light at the switch target which was subsequently turned [showing purple] for the spur by the switchman.
  • Francophone members thought Birse was drunk but Anglophone members said there was no evidence, and furthermore, one could argue it was more likely that Switchman Dubois was drunk.
  • Coroner Jones spoke briefly, saying to the jury that Conductor Stone (of the Express) and General Superintendent Stevenson (of the GTR) had testified that the accident would not have occurred if the switchman and engineer had done their duty.
  • Fireman Samuel Edwards of the Toronto Express was recalled. He testified that Engineer Birse, after passing the semaphore, had put his head out of the cab and continued to look forward until 2-3 engine lengths before the switch. He said the Express was travelling at 12-15 mph at that point.
  • Coroner Jones again raised the idea that following the Grand Trunk's rules would have prevented the accident. It was now in the jury's hands (12 members) to determine their verdict in private. 


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Circa 1909 - taken from an approaching steamboat. from: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec


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Here is the Montreal Daily Witness account of the coroner's jury verdict.

I have not attempted to summarize it.



James R Dick - the dissenting juror - is quoted at length by the newspaper 
regarding his reasoning for not signing the verdict. These ideas include:

"The rules of the Grand Trunk were the best that experience could devise, and it was not the fault of the rules, but the fault of Dubois in breaking the rules, which led to the accident."

"Mr Dick said it was nothing less than presumption for the jurors to sit in judgment upon a Company which had over forty years experience and whose rules had been found equal to every other occasion, while the plain fact was scarcely mentioned that it was the breaking of the rules which led to the accident."

... The Lovell's Montreal Directory of 1890-1891 indicates that there is a James R Dick, who lives at 115-117-119 Mountain (today de la Montagne - even though 'Mountain' was named after a clergyman with that surname). Mr Dick's occupation is listed as "superintendent Boys' home". The listed address is in Griffintown, which is just across the Lachine Canal from the Point St Charles headquarters (back then), and the yards and shops of the Grand Trunk Railway.

... It seems possible that the nearby Grand Trunk could have been supportive in providing employment and apprenticeship opportunities for boys. Perhaps, beyond the simple facts found by the inquest, Mr Dick's strong feelings might also be based on his experiences and dealings with the company in the course of his work.

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Here is the editorial from the Montreal Daily Witness about the verdict and the 'mixed jury' system.


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A souvenir postcard of the Lachine Wharf from 1907.

The faint postmark indicates it was mailed.
The photo probably shows one of the commercial tracks connecting with the Lachine Wharf spur.

from: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec