SP 1941 Tunnel 26 Accident - Factors Beyond the ICC Report

Blame the dead guy?!

This is the final look at the Southern Pacific Tunnel 26 accident of 19 November 1941, involving the Extra 4193 West.

Readers probably noticed that the official accident investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission did not consider as many parameters as a modern multi-disciplinary accident investigation would today. 

Essentially, the report said the accident occurred because: 

1) The train stalled in the tunnel. 

2) No one turned off the oil supply after this happened. 

My post which includes the ICC's report can be found here:

SP 1941 Tunnel 26 Accident - The Official Interstate Commerce Commission Report

All of the previous Southern Pacific-related posts can be found

by pressing the Short Subjects 02 radio button (in the top banner)

and scrolling down alphabetically until your reach the 'SP ... ' items.

*  *  *

The engineer and the young fireman (the 'engine crew' responsible for the oil supply) both died in the accident. The ICC investigators provide a neat, factual conclusion. It places no responsibility on the railroad, anyone in company management, or anyone who is alive.

In an earlier post, I tried to describe the economic boom being experienced in California in 1941 ... created by the 'wartime economy' which immediately preceded the US entry in World War 2. 

We do not know if this boom contributed to the loss of experienced railroad workers to more stable and 'family friendly', well-paying industrial work ... or if increased traffic demand resulted in a wave of new employee hiring. 

The short period the fireman had been employed is cited in the investigation. After unpaid student trips with practical instruction (of variable quality) in the cab of a working engine ... and self-study (no formal classroom instruction) ... the fireman would have been judged ready to begin work under the normal supervision of an engineer. 

The ICC report does not address the issue of new employee training.

... In the 1940s, is it likely that a newly-hired fireman would be empowered - during any of this casual training - to 'shut down' the locomotive of his own volition if he had identified a safety emergency?

*  *  *

This post will look at five factors:

1. Train crew members.

2. Engine crew members.

3. The Extra 4193 West and the timetable.

4. The role played by maintenance of way equipment.

5. Decision making, task saturation and situational awareness.

*  *  *

We do not know if there were any professional consequences for the four surviving crew members. 

Similarly, we do not know if the railroad officials supervising these employees, or other aspects of railroad operations, were subject to company sanctions. 

We do not know how the survivors' lives were affected by this tragedy.

*  *  *

1. Train Crew Members (4)

The conductor is responsible for conducting the movement over the line. On this train, there was a brakeman on the engine and two brakemen in the caboose with the conductor. Traditionally, the conductor would work collegially with the engineer - rather than trying to 'pull rank' on general decision-making.

With the advent of more powerful motive power and 100-car trains, this traditional arrangement breaks down. In 1941, there was no end-to-end radio communication on SP trains. How could a conductor instruct or confer with the engineer? The crew in the caboose could only give physical signals along the side of the train to relay instructions - assuming the engine crew was looking back to see them at precisely that moment.

... Or ... the conductor could 'pull the air' if there was a rules-based justification for it. The act of slamming on the emergency brakes - if not reasonable in the engineer's eyes - would send a shockwave through the local engineer community on the same day it happened. Only a micro-managing conductor who didn't respect engineers would put the whole train into emergency! 

(In fact, I think I remember seeing old caboose brake valves which allowed a range of increasing brake pipe reductions. However, I think it was necessary to stop the train before any graduated brake pipe reduction by the conductor could be reversed.) 

In any case, there was a strong social disincentive to using the conductor's valve to 'communicate'. 

Consequently ...

In most cases, the engineer had all the responsibility of ... supervising the fireman; protecting the company's valuable capital investment in the motive power (and steam locomotives were very labour-intensive to operate); ensuring the movement follows all the rules and speed limits; do all the 'driving'; and thus take sole responsibility for all of the rolling stock and its contents for most of the trip.

To oversimplify: With a 100-car train in the 1940s, the conductor is just along as a passenger who handles company paperwork, and who leads and supervises the train crew when the train has stopped to conduct switching moves.

As an example: This conductor was not aware of the conditions at the locomotive inside Tunnel 26. Consequently a tailend brakeman was sent toward the headend with a verbal movement directive for the engineer. This messenger died from the lack of oxygen just a few car-lengths into his long trip in darkness to the headend.

2. Engine Crew Members (2 + 1 student)

To become an engineer, one must first work as a fireman. A fireman's work leaves little room for error. A fireman's mistake which the engineer does not notice can precipitate a wide variety of consequences: from merely expensive for the company ... to catastrophic with the loss of life.

In addition to the 24-year-old fireman with 2 months' experience, this engineer had a second 24-year-old student fireman in his cab. 

A fireman whose skills are not fully developed can undermine the outcomes the company expects of the engineer. The 'in real time' supervising railroad official (i.e. the dispatcher) expects the train to get over a busy subdivision in the normal time. It is up to the engineer to achieve this - new fireman or not.

At some point or another, the engineer on the Extra 4193 West had to: think of ... monitor ... coach ... or compensate for ... two inexperienced firemen working on his engine.

Further adding to the engineer's cognitive workload, the experienced brakeman on the headend provided unsolicited input en route on the need to stop and repair a faulty cylinder cock observed on his side of the engine. The engineer declined to do this, citing the delay this repair would cause.

ICC report: "According to the statement of the student fireman who was on the engine the engineer experienced difficulty with the throttle throughout the trip."

It is unclear whether the engineer's problems with throttle control were the result of: 

• A basic ergonomic failing of the cab design and the throttle lever.
• A physical or medical problem the engineer had.
• A defect the company shop had not repaired on this essential control. 

The throttle control problems contributed significantly to the loss-of-life accident, according to the ICC investigation.

*  *  *

The Assigned Crew

Considering this train - an extra freight running at night - we may conclude that these crew members are not a 'regular crew'. That is, they are not regularly assigned to work together on a particular job at the same time each day. 

They are working out of the Los Angeles 'hub' - from which radiate many subdivisions, and industrial and switching work assignments. Perhaps only the headend brakeman, conductor and engineer (all with years of service) know each other well. 

The fireman and the tailend brakemen may have been called from their spareboards ... where low-seniority workers waited for a call to work: 24 hours per day, 7 days a week.

It is only in modern investigations that the following foundation for performance is documented: 

That each member of the crew is fit, rested and qualified for duty. None of this was considered in the ICC report. 

*  *  *

3. The Extra 4193 West and the Timetable

• Below, is the timetable in force at the time of the accident. 
• Traffic on the Ventura Subdivision is controlled by timetable, train orders and an automatic block system.
• Extra 4193 West is 96 cars + caboose in length, 3550 tons (the maximum rating for the engine here was 3650 tons).
• It departs from Los Angeles yard at mileage 479.7 at 2315hr on 18 November 1941.
• The siding capacities and subdivision mileages are shown on Page 2, below. Page 3 is supplied only for completeness and to show that there are no scheduled westbound freights which could help us calculate the expected progress our extra would make over the subdivision. While Train No 373, the Coast Merchandise Westbound, originates at LA Yard, it transports LCL freight, fresh produce and other perishables. Special rolling stock allows it to travel at passenger train speeds.
• We do not know anything about the traffic on the railroad that night. The only thing that I can assume is that Train 812 - a Second Class eastbound train - is running, and that it is on time. 
• As the Extra 4193 West must clear for Train 812, the responsibility for calculating and organizing this meet falls on the shoulders of the engineer. The conductor cannot participate collegially in this decision from the isolation of the caboose, 100 cars back. 

from: The employee timetable collection of the California State Railroad Museum, Sacramento. archive.org
https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001478/mode/1up

from: The employee timetable collection of the California State Railroad Museum, Sacramento. archive.org
https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001478/mode/1up

*  *  *

The Engineer Calculates the Meet

screencaps from: Southern Pacific employee timetable 183, Los Angeles Division, 8 July 1945. archive.org
https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001553/page/n19/mode/1up

• The map above is identical to the map published with the 1941 timetable. 
• My yellow dots and labels show the route. The times are from the ICC report.
• The red dot is the accident location.
• The red labels show the expected scheduled progress of Train 812 against Extra 4193 West.
• The three green dots show the only sidings in which the Extra 4193 West will fit.
• My guess is that Moorpark would be the chosen location to clear ... if the extra makes normal progress.
• Once the extra passes Santa Susana siding, the engineer is committed to clearing at Moorpark. Stopping at Santa Susana would probably result in the conductor 'collegially' stomping up the ballast and demanding to know why they are waiting for an hour on a siding. 
• Completely clearing at Moorpark would typically be 5 minutes before the 0135hr scheduled time of No 812. This means the extra is stopped in the siding, with its headlight off, and with the switch behind the caboose lined and locked for the passage of No 812. No 812 will be governed by the ABS signals indicating track occupancy (if the Extra has not cleared) as it approaches the siding.
• While this meet is a laboured calculation for me, it would be a routine decision for an experienced engineer. 
• We cannot know if aiming for the target of Moorpark influenced the engineer's decision not to stop to repair the cylinder cock. 
• Similarly, we cannot know that the cylinder cock defect was definitive in the stalling of the train in Tunnel 26.

I would be very surprised if only these two trains were operating that night. Given the increased demand to move 'wartime' traffic, it seems much more likely that additional extra movements ... and/or routine dispatcher modifications to the schedule through train orders ... were added to the engineer's mental model of the subdivision traffic that night.

*  *  *

4. The role played by maintenance of way equipment.

In the footnotes at the back of the timetable is this text.

from: The employee timetable collection of the California State Railroad Museum, Sacramento. archive.org
https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001478/mode/1up

Automatic mechanical flange (rail) lubricators were intended to decrease friction between the wheel flanges and the 'gauge face' of the rails on curves. 

As a maintenance of way device, they decreased rail wear - reducing the familiar flange-squealing sound. They could also help prevent derailments on curves when gauge face friction was so great that a wheel would climb over the rail and cause a derailment. 

Below, is text from a 300-page book published by Imperial Oil/Esso on all aspects of railroad lubricants, circa 1950. (Imperial Oil/Esso was a Canadian subsidiary of the former Standard Oil - Exxon.)

from: Railway Lubrication; circa 1950; Imperial Oil.

The design of the flange lubricators used by the SP in 1941 was probably of a less efficient, earlier design from the 1930s. 

Even in the 1970s and 1980s these devices always seemed to be sitting in a black wasteland of fugitive grease. The deep grease reservoir in the diagram (above) suggests that maintenance of the device is not going to be a daily task during which the section gang comes by with a roll of paper towels and wipes away any grease which has fouled the top of the rail.

Continuing with flange-rail friction ... the 4193 did not need any blind driving wheels (i.e. none were flangeless) because its two eight-driving-wheel 'engines', were articulated to move independently of each other. Among the driving wheels, some axles were also designed to accept lateral motion. This engine probably cornered like it was on rails. 

Below is a wonderfully helpful section of a 'track profile' from Multimodalways (linked below). It is from 1992. However, the mileage of Chatsworth 445.5 is identical to the 1941 employee timetable (numbered from Santa Barbara) so the curves and tunnels can be assumed to have the same mileages as well.

I have added polka dots to make it festive. 

 

from: Multimodalways - SP Lawrence-Burbank Jct Track Chart 1992 (PDF)
https://www.multimodalways.org/archives/rrs/SP/SP%20Track%20Charts/SP%20Track%20Charts.html

• On the line near the top with all the labels, you can see Tunnel 26 labelled, then 27, 28 and Chatsworth at 445.5 .  
• The next line down is the track mileage graduated in tenths of miles, i.e. 440, 440.1, 440.2 etc., type of rail, ballast, etc.

• The bottom line shows gradient (and/or ruling grade), coming eastbound from Santa Barbara ... so minus 1.0 ( ... or +1.0 % for the 4193 as it approaches Tunnel 26 westbound, purple dot).
• The line above gradient shows curvature. My blue dots show the two distinctive ~90 degree curves east of the tunnel are identified as 223 and 224. You'll notice that they straddle very short Tunnel 28.

• Referring to the timetable note above: lubricators are at 442.7, 443.7 . These are marked with red dots on the track profile.

At the top of Page 6 of the ICC report, it says: 

"When the engine was at a point about 5,000 feet east of the east portal of tunnel No. 26 the engine slipped and the train stalled. After the slack was taken twice the train proceeded and when the engine entered the tunnel the speed was between 10 and 12 miles per hour. At a point 3,899 feet west of the east portal, or approximately half way through the tunnel, the engine again slipped and the train stalled." 

... As the engine slipped and stopped inside Tunnel 26 ... the train slack ran in from inertia ... and back out from gravity ... and when the runout of slack reached back 75 cars to the steel gondola loaded with steel ... it broke its knuckle and the train brakes went into emergency. This locked up the wheels on the whole train. This emergency brake application marked the beginning of the fatal accident.

*  *  *

If you notice the mileage and location of the first lubricator the engine passed over (the red dot at the right, above) ... "5000 feet from the portal" is consistent with a point reached shortly after the engine ran over the first lubricator. The engine slipped here twice.

I have tried to accurately transcribe the two red dots on the track profile above to a current GoogleMaps view of this track section as it appears today. 

The 4193 passed over the second lubricator as it was entering Tunnel 26. 

But if the 4193 slipped and the train stalled at the first lubricator, why didn't the train stall at the second lubricator just outside the tunnel?

And how was the 4193 able, after passing that second lubricator, to pull the whole train onto the 1% grade inside Tunnel 26 before slipping with the train stalling.

(The ICC diagram of Tunnel 26 gradient appears below.)

Having slipped ... stalled ... taken slack twice in order to restart the train ... knowing he was approaching a second lubricator ... and knowing he would be running his train up a 1% grade ... while pulling 3550.5 tons (of a rated 3650 tons for the engine in this territory) ... the engineer would perhaps be taking no chances with traction and he might be sanding heavily. 

As we saw in a recent post about pre-trip locomotive inspection, taking slack, cylinder cocks and sanding ... 

from: Locomotive Management; AB Carson; 1928, 1937; International Textbook Co.

I have read many books about railroad operating procedures but I had never encountered this paradoxical side effect of sanding before. 

Since the long-ago adoption of diesel-electric power, with its high tractive effort and good adhesion at low speed, it seems possible this 'stalling because of sand' might be a 'lost railroad phenomenon'. Given how frictionless shaped steel wheels on steel rails are, this unexpected effect of sanding is yet another fascinating aspect of wheel-rail physical science. 

We will never know whether the flange lubricators and reactive sanding were significant factors in this accident. 

The ICC investigators were extremely diligent in their review of the local physical forensics inside the tunnel: measuring and locating the roof damage from the exhaust and safety valve discharge ... and the rail burns from slipping ... to recreate the engine's movement within Tunnel 26. 

However, they made absolutely no mention of the two lubricators' locations, state of repair, or functioning at all. 

They did not analyze the train dynamics and traction at the point of the first slipping (twice) and gathering of slack (twice) at/near the first lubricator.

*  *  *

Train Handling

When knuckles break and trains stall on grades, investigations have typically looked at the performance of the engineer and his 'train handling'. The 75th car of 96 was a gondola car constructed of steel which was loaded with steel. It was a slack runout which broke the knuckle on this car and precipitated the accident.

The conductor denied that there had been any problem with harsh slack action in the train up to that point. The marshaling of loads/empties in the train is not discussed in the ICC report.

The investigators suggest that because the independent brake was found in the applied position after the accident, this had probably caused the slack runout and the breaking of the knuckle on the steel gondola.

*  *

Those Onboard the Engine

The accounts given by the participants to newspapers immediately - during the first 24-48 hours after the accident - are not always the same as the actions and accounts which were taken under oath and included in the ICC report.

Speaking from his hospital bed, the student fireman stated: 

"When the engine stalled I went out one side of the cab with [the brakeman] while the other two climbed out the other side."

 

...  then ... his 5-word gift to the journalists: "like being lost in hell" ... then ...

"[The brakeman] and I made our way to the end of the tunnel - and after we got our breath we went back in to find out what happened to the engineer and the fireman." 

Prescott Evening Courier (Arizona), 19 November 1941.

... Having struggled in the dark for 3529 feet to reach the west portal, the brakeman and student fireman had narrowly escaped death. At the upper (west) portal of the tunnel, where most of the gases would naturally flow and accumulate, no reasonable person would expect them to retrace their steps back into the tunnel.

Standard Code of the AAR, 1940, General Rules, Rule L:

"In case of danger to the Company's property employe[e]s must unite to protect it." 

The headend brakeman and the engineer probably knew each other from their years of service. In reading the newspaper accounts of the accident, I have always wondered about the terms on which these two veterans parted ...

Nowhere is there any account that the engineer told the brakeman and student to leave the equipment to save themselves.

If the brakeman and student exited one side of the cab and the engineer and fireman the other, was the engineer aware that the brakeman had made the bold and appropriate decision to save his life and that of the student's by abandoning the train?

*  *  *

On these engines, I believe the pull-handle-cable-linkage to release the spring-loaded oil cut-off inside the tender was always located on the backhead cab wall - that is, behind the engineer and fireman. It was located here so either member of the engine crew could easily reach it to cut the fuel when any emergency required a quick response. The ICC report stated that it had not been triggered, but that it worked flawlessly during the investigation.

What are the possible reasons why the fuel was not turned off in this manner?

5. Decision making, task saturation and situational awareness.

Earlier, I suggested that the fireman (with two months' experience) would not consider it being within the realm of his authority to decide that the engine must be shut down.

The ICC report notes the failure to move the fireman's oil regulator valve to the 'drifting' (i.e. like 'idle') setting ... or to close the oil regulator valve entirely. 

However, as I understand it, closing the fireman's oil regulator valve would shut the engine (fire) down ... having the same effect as if the fireman had actuated the emergency cutoff via the cable leading to the tender valve.

Having a '100-car freight train going into emergency in the centre of Tunnel 26' would not have been covered in the fireman's training materials or his trial trip instruction. When this happened, he would look to the engineer ... in order to follow his instructions in this emergency situation. 

*  *  *

It was the engineer's fault.

... That is the conclusion the ICC investigation leaves us with. 

I think the engineer did not turn off the oil supply using the cable-linked tender valve 

because he could not.

The reasons might include:

A) He had a medical crisis (eg. a heart attack) before he could act.

B) He was injured in the cab or as he exited the cab (eg. he was scalded, or he fell from the cab ladder, or he fell into one of the tunnel drains). 

C) He was trying to solve the problem in a 'conventional railroad way' - which would cause the least delay to his train and to the traffic on the railroad. 

He may not expect that the young fireman (or the student) has left the oil regulator valve in a low 'working engine' fire setting which is creating choking smoke. This is because the 'working fire' is not being drafted by the exhaust of a working engine. 

He expects he will be 'examined' by management over his train-handling, so he is working efficiently to add as little delay as possible. With the brakeman unable to reach the tender to cut the power off the train, it is up to him to wait out the safety valve steam, uncouple the engine, and run it out of the tunnel.

The 'correct' answer from the safety of a 2026 blog post is 'to stop the fire to preserve life' ... and get the engine out of the tunnel and out of the way (for the moment) by using the steam pressure in the boiler. But ...

... Perhaps the engineer was well aware that everything on an oil-fired engine needs high pressure steam. The tender tank heater to keep the heavy bunker oil flowing, the oil superheater to get it to burning temperature, the atomizer to break the heavy oil into fine a mist which can burn, the blower to draft the fire of a stationary locomotive, the injector to keep the boiler filled with water. 

... If the fire was extinguished and boiler steam was consumed to run the engine out of the tunnel, an extended delay might occur because remedial efforts would have to be made to re-light the stubborn heavy oil with diminished steam pressure. Next, would come the work to nurse the boiler back to operating temperature to produce adequate quantities of steam.

... The ICC report suggests cutting the oil supply (they are as smart as a 2026 blogger) ... or leaving the oil regulator in the drifting setting. However, the ICC offers no estimate on life expectancy for the workers in the small air volume of the tunnel even with this lighter fire setting. The reason for the emergency air brake application would have to be found and corrected while the fire burned away inside the confined area of the tunnel with the crew members present.

Speaking of the emergency air brake application. As far as the headend knows, uncoupling the engine would leave all 96 cars at rest on a 1% grade. If the air bleeds off and the tailend crew did not take the precaution of applying an adequate number of handbrakes, an eastbound runaway of the entire train might occur.

D) Task Saturation. I won't drag you through the list again. But see if you can imagine and/or recall all the information, calculations and functions the engineer has had to consider and perform ... from his usual pre-trip responsibilities as an engineer ... up to this point ... one hour (37 miles) into his 108-mile workday.

Hi-lites: After leaving Los Angeles yard, he's had two inexperienced fireman working on his engine. He's had problems with the throttle, traction, and with stalling the train (three times). He is aware of the probability of discipline by company management because of the situation he now finds himself in ... in Tunnel 26. He can't account for the whereabouts of the brakeman and the student who were in his cab. He's trying to imagine the best way to handle whichever mystery problem has caused the emergency brake application. He has no idea what the tailend crew is doing. 

E) Loss of Situational Awareness. Because of the engineer's task saturation with 'conventional railroad procedures' it is impossible for him to recognize that in only a few minutes he and his fireman will become unconscious and then die. That is why he does not extinguish the fire.

*  *  *

The End

*  *  *

By way of being constructive and preventing this type of occurrence from happening again in 1941, I would look at the following issues:

1. While the ICC details all of the engineer's cab control settings as they were found ... and shows that there was adequate sand ... and that the emergency oil cutoff worked ... and the impractical and irrelevant observation that no respirators were signed out of the shop in Los Angeles - i.e. a full hood with a hose coming out the top which attaches to the air brake system. Their investigation DOES NOT comment on the proper functioning of the throttle lever. Was there a defect which the shop left uncorrected? The report DOES NOT explain (if it might account for a loss of traction in Tunnel 26) WHY an engine is leaving the shop with an constantly open, malfunctioning cylinder cock. 

2. The ICC offers a short sentence in recognition of the fact that the fireman "involved had but little experience". However, it makes no pronouncement on the training of that fireman. Should new firemen be trained that crew safety is paramount and that, in the event of an emergency in a long tunnel, the FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST BE to ask the engineer: 'Should the oil regulator valve be closed or should the emergency oil cutoff be engaged until the reason for the emergency brake application is known?'

3. The ICC does not comment on how having an inexperienced fireman AND a student fireman in the cab at the same time affects the efficiency and safety of locomotive operations. It does not address how this might create unnecessary distractions for the engineer. 

4. The ICC notes the location of the first loss of traction, wheel slip and train stalling (twice at that location). It does not mention the fact that this loss of traction was at the site of a flange lubricator. It does not record the STATE OF MAINTENANCE of that flange lubricator, or the second flange lubricator at the east portal of Tunnel 26. Were the traction surfaces of the rails found to be fouled with grease at either lubricator location? Are there better places to locate these devices?

end

"To Strike Is No Remedy ...

To quit is starvation, and to continue is death; not immediately perhaps, but inevitable if he remains long enough in the service."

EF O'Shea, Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen. 

A fraternal-financial organization with 15,000 members in 1890.

*  *  *

This post gives a short sample of the testimony given to the US Senate's Interstate Commerce Committee in 1890. It follows my earlier look at railcar construction in the late 1800s. During that period, the obvious necessity of developing consistent safety standards for North American railways was receiving widespread attention. 

In 1863, Ezra Miller had patented the Miller Hook to help prevent passenger car telescoping during a collision or derailment. It was reviewed in a previous post.

Ezra Miller Saved Lives

In 1873, EH Janney had received a patent for his most recent coupler innovation. This patent introduced the movable 'knuckle'. 

Just reading the testimony before the Committee provides a vivid image of the deplorable safety conditions for railroad employees. 

The shocking loss of life in passenger train accidents was easily presented in the newspapers so it would receive the attention it deserved from the politicians and railroad officials. However, the lethal working conditions for running trades employees in freight service - with most citizens being unable to imagine or identify with their plight - was a more persistent area of regulatory neglect. 

In testimony, it was estimated that 1 in 5 brakemen and conductors would survive their careers to 'die a natural death'. 

*  *  *

It would take the efforts of a social reformer who served as Iowa's Railroad Commissioner from 1883 to 1888 to focus the attention and action of the US Congress on the issue. While the early, relatively short railroad lines had come under state jurisdiction, the growth of railroad company systems far beyond state lines required the oversight of people seeing the 'big picture' of railroading. 

from: History of Railroads in America; Oliver Jensen; 1975; Random House.

Lorenzo Coffin (1823-1915) was one of the people responsible for the eventual development of the Railroad Safety Appliance Act.

Appropriately, Coffin is the first witness as the testimony begins.

The 'power brake' is differentiated from the manual train brake then in use which was applied by brakemen running along the tops of cars to apply handbrakes. One witness takes care to distinguish between a power brake and an automatic brake. Today, we would expect an automatic air brake system to create an Emergency application in the event the train line was broken in some way - without it being initiated by the engineer. 

In some of the testimony regarding the formal testing of early air (and other) brake systems, a witness speaks of riding in one of the 50 boxcars travelling down the 1% grade used by the test train. The violent run-in of slack caused the riders to be thrown against the leading end of the boxcar. Some riders had taken the precaution of surrounding themselves with pillows ... but pillows and all still made the sudden trip forward. It seems likely that experimental straight air systems were also being tested ... and the slow propagation of the straight air through the train line would be a very effective way of creating such violent slack action.

The 'automatic coupler' in its simplest terms meant that a brakeman did not have to stand between cars during coupling - that the coupler 'dropped the pin' automatically as the brakeman stood safely outside the rails and watched.

*  *  *

Here are some of the defects in the design of railroad freight cars identified in the testimony.

In searching through my books, I have seen hundreds of triangular 'cowcatcher' pilots from the late 1800s with their hinged link and pin coupling bar in the centre. The 3/4 front view of trains has always been extremely popular. However, photos showing the rear of a tender, or the end of freight cars are relatively rare. 

from: The Central Pacific & Southern Pacific Railroads; Lucius Beebe; 1963; Howell-North.

Above, at Promontory, Utah in 1869 is an example showing many of the design shortcomings of freight cars. You can see a coupler pocket into which a link has been inserted, with the pin dropped to hold the end of the link in the coupler pocket. A brakeman coupling another car would insert that link into the approaching pocket and drop another pin to secure it there.

Braking system: You can see the narrow roofwalk and the handwheel at the roof to apply the 'train brakes' when they are called for by the engineer's whistle signal. At the very bottom of the handbrake shaft is a chain which will wrap around the shaft as it is turned. The chain is connected to links/levers which will draw the brake shoes into contact with the treads of the wheels. The large transverse wooden bar below the coupler is the brake beam. At the left end of the brake beam, thanks to the sunlight, you can see the left brake shoe which will be applied to the left wheel tread.

Above the coupler pocket, and bolted to it, is a heavy 'deadwood' (probably a slang term). The deadwood is a sturdy piece of wood providing a strong connection between the coupler pocket and the car frame. 

Why automatic couplers are needed: An identical car is approaching the (imaginary) brakeman, standing beside the coupler pocket of the car above. With a pin in hand, he is ready to insert that link and drop the pin into the approaching pocket. Assume the momentum of the movement approaching the car above will push the standing car back two or three feet ...

1. You (you have become the brakeman) stand beside the stationary coupler pocket, align and skilfully insert the link into the approaching pocket and quickly drop the pin.
2. Avoid getting your hands or fingers crushed between the link, the two coupler pockets and the pin.
3. As the cars move two or three feet, walk with them, so the approaching brake beam does not catch your ankle and break it, or cause your legs to become trapped under the approaching car.
4. Keep your torso back so it is not crushed between the deadwoods as they approach each other.
5. You may prefer to keep one foot outside the rail so you can quickly shift away from the cars if something goes wrong. However, if you adopt this position and fall, your body and limbs will land on the rail in front of the approaching wheel.
6. Become proficient at this act so you can perform it at night, in the rain, by the light of a dim coal oil lantern.

*  *  *

from: Railroad Album; John O'Connell; 1954; Popular Mechanics.

The lovely illustration above shows two different designs of car end appurtenances. The upper design shows deadwoods (or perhaps metal 'bumpers', in this case) which are almost flush (if viewed in a side profile) with the contact face of the coupler pocket. A brakeman would have to be particularly skilful to perform a coupling pin drop and extract his arm so it was not caught if the second car had identical deadwoods/bumpers.

On the lower image, you can see a brakeman walking with the approaching movement. The link is raised, ready for insertion into the stationary car. Then the pin will be dropped into the stationary car's coupler pocket. At least in this case, the deadwoods pose less of a crushing hazard than those in the upper design.

*  *  *

from: History of Railroads in America; Oliver Jensen; 1975; Random House.

Again, here is detail from a photo taken during the construction of the Union Pacific as a stone bridge is being constructed by masons. Beneath the straddling man, you can see the link and pin couplers and the two pins inserted into them. This image shows that the faces of the two coupler pockets are in direct contact with each other. This illustrates the crushing hazard between the coupler faces ... the brakeman's hand must occupy that space between those faces as he inserts the link.

*  *  *

I will likely continue with this topic in the future. 

Below is the correct name and link to the archive.org document I have found so interesting. 

One could analyze it for years ... but I probably won't go that far.

Automatic couplers and power brakes

US Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce

https://archive.org/details/automaticcouple00commgoog/page/n7/mode/1up

*  *  *

As you'll notice, the data below (Page 6 of testimony) has been compiled by Lorenzo Coffin.

The Master Car Builders origin and elaboration below is interesting. The term appears in the Science of Railways (circa 1900 - a decade after this testimony) as an entire 400+ page volume is dedicated to standard car design based on the standards of the Master Car Builders.

It was funny to discover that MCB is a term of solemn significance in railroad history. In the 1980s, I was privileged to visit a local 'dream' layout - lots of brass steam locomotives, etc. The owner was referred to with appropriate awe because he had completed the necessary peer-reviewed exercises to be formally recognized (I presume in HO) as a 'Master Car Builder'.

All the different types of Janney couplers will be illustrated in a future post. 

In testimony, railroad officials generally pointed out that air brakes were not practical to use with 50-car trains unless there were Janney-type couplers because of the significant slack action created by long consists of link and pin. Their opinions for Janney-type implementation ran the gamut from continued laissez-faire to immediate federal regulation. 

A problem I had not considered was the 'supply chain' issue and the need to avoid rushing out and buying just any Janney-style couplers. The railroads wanted and needed good quality, durable Janney-style couplers (estimated conversion cost per car: close to $100 in 1890 dollars) and the skilled labour to complete the changeover in a reasonable period ... of YEARS. There were more than one million freight cars in service in the US in 1890. 

Another problem involved our poor brakemen again. Testimony stated that it was significantly more dangerous for a less-experienced brakeman to step in between two freight cars when one car had the usual non-standardized link and pin appliance, and the other had a non-standardized Janney-type. This more dangerous condition would persist for years during the conversion period. (In old photos, you'll notice that early Janneys often had a notch in the knuckle. The link would go into that notch and the pin was dropped down the hole in the knuckle to secure it.)

One of the officials was asked if he knew about the state of affairs concerning brakes and couplers in Canada and he had no idea.

ICC 1930 Tank Car Regulations (Flammable)

The 5 x 7 inch booklet from which these regulations are taken is 443 pages long. Although there is some overlap with other types of hazardous goods, I have tried to focus on the regulations covering tank cars used for the transportation of flammable liquids. All images in this post are from this booklet, except for the tank car photo.

Early in the age of petroleum, crude oil would have been transported in wooden barrels or circular, covered wooden vats mounted on tank cars. Titusville (1859), Pennsylvania; and Oil Springs (1858) and Petrolia (1866) in Canada were the sites of the first major efforts in North America to commercialize petroleum production.

While these two international rivals sometimes debate which location was technically 'first' ... it was in 1854 at Bibrka (in today's southeast Poland) that Ignacy Łukasiewicz, a Polish polymath, first obtained petroleum in its natural state, distilled it and invented the kerosene lamp. 

In 1854 Łukasiewicz said: "This liquid is the future wealth of the country, it's the wellbeing and prosperity of its inhabitants, it's a new source of income for the poor, and a new branch of industry which shall bear plentiful fruit."

The industrializing world was ready for petroleum products which could more cleanly and effectively produce light and lubrication - replacing less satisfactory oil and fat substances derived from animals.

Back then, the lighter fractions of oil (like gasoline) had no practical use. The very first light horseless carriages which burned petroleum in an internal combustion engine were only being invented by Carl Benz as the last spike of the CPR was being driven. After Benz's earliest inventions, practical vehicles which could climb hills or be driven on typical city roads were at least a decade in the future.

Consider, then, that as the first crude oil was being transported in the late 1800s, crudes which were higher in lighter crude fractions (again, like gasoline) constituted a nasty, unprofitable safety hazard for the refinery workers and railroaders who had to handle them. By the time this booklet had been published in 1930 by the Interstate Commerce Commission, hundreds (and more likely thousands) of workers had been killed or suffered debilitating burns through accidents, ignorance and the inadequacies of early tank car design.

from: GATX, A History of the General American Transportation Company, 1898-1948; Ralph C Epstein; 1948; North River Press.

Colour-blindness, Visual Acuity, Hearing Tests - 1897

Safety rules are written in _____.

As the railroad network expanded across the United States in the late 1800s, state regulation of local railroad activities resulted in a patchwork of safety standards. Railroad companies had crossed state lines and thus were engaged in interstate commerce. 

Link and pin couplers, individual rooftop handbrakes on freight cars for train control, and the lack of proper standardized grabirons for brakemen and conductors made railroad employment a very unsafe occupation. Of course, this had spillover effects for members of the general public travelling on passenger trains.

from: Railroads in America; Oliver Jensen; 1975; American Heritage.

Railroad Superintendent, Inspector of Steam Boilers - a cartoon from 1883.

Eventually, Congress acted in 1893, bringing forth the Railroad Safety Appliance Act:

An Act to Promote the Safety of Employees and Travelers upon Railroads by Compelling Common Carriers Engaged in Interstate Commerce to Equip Their Cars with Automatic Couplers and Continuous Brakes and Their Locomotives with Driving-wheel Brakes, and for Other Purposes.

Railroads had 7 years to bring themselves into compliance with the law.

The Interstate Commerce Commission collated and maintained comprehensive railroad safety statistics.

Regulating railroad safety after years of 'non-interference'
was an overdue exercise in the late 1890s

*  *  *

Another interesting safety development of this time period ... the first Standard Code ... was published in July 1889. In its modern day incarnation, this was the master standardized rulebook language promulgated by the Association of American Railroads. It could be adapted to suit the needs of local railroads - including those in Canada. It promoted standardized safe practices to protect property and human life. 

... A key benefit of this type of continent-wide exercise was that individual railroads did not have to 're-invent the wheel' after one serious accident on their own railroad. Rule revisions necessary because of serious accidents, new technology (eg. the telephone), or to employ equally effective but less cumbersome safety rules ... could be reviewed and adopted before a particular railroad, itself, had a crisis.

*  *  *

Testing Vision and Hearing for Railway Employees

Having preserved this fragile artifact for quite a while, I am glad to finally be discharging my responsibility to it. It is a reprinted section from a medical textbook on the eye. You can find this chapter within several versions of the textbook available on archive.org. But the full medical textbook is about structure and diseases of the eye.

A little over 40 years ago, I was fortunate to briefly see, and work in, a perfect example of an isolated railway town - Schreiber, Ontario. Back in 1977, the entire division was run from the CPR station there. The superintendent, his staff and his official car; the dispatchers; carmen, and everyone and everything else you can imagine as being necessary in the diesel age ... remained in this single-purpose town. As I've mentioned before, we were told it had the highest per capita income of any town in Ontario because of the union and management jobs concentrated here.

A classroom instruction program for new spareboard trainmen has just started. Instruction was provided by a freight conductor. Before beginning one's employment, vision testing and a physical exam by the local doctor were required. Among other things, the doctor inspected your spine - looking for any signs of disc problems which might get in the way of changing coupler knuckles in complete comfort.

I can't remember if hearing was checked by the physician or at the division office. Good hearing was important - whether you were communicating via radio ... (in the old days) listening for an approaching whistle at a siding's mile board ... or being aware of your surroundings and the nearly-silent ringing of a kicked car's wheels as it approached you in the darkness of a yard.

Eighty years after the following supplement on sensory testing was produced, the visual exam was considerably less complicated. Individually, we presented ourselves at the division office upstairs and an employee trained in the process checked our vision ...

The acuity part consisted of reading a standard eye chart and (probably) reading text in various sizes of print - all without glasses ... like a standard optometry test.

... They didn't simulate completing a Rule 264/266 form with a pencil (pencils don't freeze), working at a plywood daffodil telephone box, wearing a wire 1940s headset, illuminated by a battery trainman's lantern. If you were doing this because your train was blocking the main line, it would be an inconvenient time for the employer to discover that you couldn't see or hear well.

Railroaders were always looking for distant objects ... such as signals; switch targets and switch point alignment; and locomotive, car and signal numbers. If your unaided distance vision was not good enough, you would not be hired.  Obviously, lots of people wanted to be spareboard trainmen and the CPR could take their pick of people with perfect vision.

*  *  *

An engineer comes around a curve at speed.

On the track ahead, one these displays is seen.

The engineer would have two very different reactions

... illustrating the need for uncompromised colour sense.

from: Uniform Code of Operating Rules; CPR; 1951.

*  *  *

Rule 99 illustrates the need to have
visual acuity, acceptable colour sense and good hearing.

from: Operating Rules; CNR, Grand Trunk, Duluth Winnipeg and Pacific, Central Vermont Railway; 1929.

*  *  *

Getting Back to Schreiber ...

It was the colour sense test that was the most interesting to me, and the most surprising - because I never pictured Casey Jones as a big knitter. It is estimated that up to 8% of males (with northern European genetics) are colour-blind. The testing employee opened up a shoe box filled with small windings of yarn in a very wide variety of colours. He picked up a bundle and asked me what colour it was, repeating the process until I had satisfied him that I'd be able to correctly perceive the colour light 'searchlight' signals, the flags marking slow orders, blue carman's flags, and so on.

Having been through that testing process, I was interested in purchasing and preserving this frail 'artifact' when I saw it 20 years later. Back in its day, it would have been important to railway officials studying ways to make their operations safer ... beyond using air brake systems, Janney-style couplers, and other safety appliances.

*  *  *

The Practical Examination of Railway Employés as to
Color-Blindness, Acuteness of Vision and Hearing

William Thomson MD, 1897

Here's the author:

American ophthalmologist, born January 28, 1833,
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; died August 3, 1907.

http://www.whonamedit.com/doctor.cfm/2203.html

This scientific paper becomes rather medically dense as you go through it. I have summary paragraphs preceding the page image - so you can decide if you want to read more detail and understand the historical issues and challenges. Their testing protocol is much more involved than my Schreiber experience ... but it doesn't hurt to begin with tight procedures and then loosen things up later.

Near the end, there is a lot of medical and process information, and I don't attempt to summarize it. Decades from now, perhaps some ferro-ophthalmolo-historiographer may find it and decide it is interesting ... you're welcome.

There are some point form sections and implementation details which you might find interesting. 

At the end of this post, I have some images to show different aspects of signalling to make things a little more interesting for readers who persevere through my effort here ...

The issue arose at the International Medical Congress of 1881, in London - how to use medically-developed testing methods for vision. This was needed for signallers and lookout men, on land and sea, to insure the safety of life and property on railways and ships.

There was a need to develop simple tests for colour sense. In Europe, it seemed that governments would set standards and have medical professionals administer the tests. In England, railways were reluctant to agree to use this system.

However, how would this system work when a railway operated through different legal jurisdictions, each with their own laws? 

Consequently, the author worked to develop a system which could be used by non-medical people to perform examinations. A trial of this was done on the Pennsylvania Railroad. 

In Connecticut, railroads were concerned that a state-run system might result in the immediate discharge of 15% of their operating employees. How would the railroads deal with this loss of experience and expertise?

The advantage of a railroad company-based system, using non-medical staff for the initial tests, seemed more appropriate. Any problems requiring medical interpretation could then be forwarded to the railroad company's supervising medical authority in charge of the testing program. Employees would be tested for the following abilities:

1. To see objects at a distance and to read forms.
2. To identify the colours used in day and night signals
3. To hear sounds as required.

The need to protect skilled railroad employees from discharge because of problems with vision and hearing, and the opportunity to find them alternate employment in the railroad, was an advantage of the railroad-controlled company-wide testing system.

A trial of the author's system was conducted with 1383 conductors, engineers, firemen and brakemen. Of this group, 18% were deficient in visual acuity; 4% (55 employees) were completely colour-blind; 1.5% had hearing deficiencies.

The trial used 150 colour tints. These were assigned numbers to make follow-up by medical staff easier and more uniform.

Above, I avoided altering the colours in the image - but the paper and ink are probably 100 years old.

Below, the colours were changed to better resolve the number plates.

I couldn't find the device to which the marginal note refers.
... Just use a watch, it'll work fine.

*  *  *

Various Signalling Images
... because you made it this far.

from: The Compendium of Signals; Roger FR Karl; 1971; Boynton.

from: Railways Then and Now; OS Nock; 1975; Crown.

Above/Below: Looking west toward Union Station, Toronto, August 1914
This earlier version of Union Station (the highest tower in the distant right) was superseded by the current building.
The towerman at the left activates the crossing barrier, the pith-helmeted 'Bobby' shoos people to safety.
The hip-roofed interlocking tower is seen beside the right support of the signal bridge.
You can see the actuator rods coming from that tower and connecting to the switches.
... the closest rod appears over the head of that worker in the foreground with well-used overalls.

As you can see:
Another long-overdue railway safety change was separating
street traffic from railway traffic on different levels.
This was necessary at cities all over North America.

Below, I've enlarged some signal detail.
Notice the 'lower quadrant' semaphore on the highest mast.
There are many things you can see in the organization of those signals ...
Also notice there are two interlocked dwarf signals at track level below the signal bridge.

from: Railways Then and Now; OS Nock; 1975; Crown.

from: Operating Rules; CNR, Grand Trunk, Duluth Winnipeg and Pacific, Central Vermont Railway; 1929.

from: The Pennsylvania Railroad; Edwin P Alexander; 1947; Bonanza.

from: The Compendium of Signals; Roger FR Karl; 1971; Boynton.

It seems very unlikely that the unique Pennsylvania position light signals eliminated colour sense testing.

You can imagine there were some advantages in using these instead of colour-position signals or searchlight signals.

The PRR considered itself 'The Standard Railroad of the World'

so they probably had a long list of reasons.