The need to understand this single article has driven my recent Southern Pacific posts: SP oil firing ... Tunnels 26, 27, 28 near Chatsworth ... and the Cab-in-Front locomotives.
... As I've been researching the details of the story behind this post, I've been imagining how Rolly would react to the 'final' version which has developed. The usually safe but unforgiving nature of old railway technology, and the tremendous forces involved, were things which Rolly knew well.
... Listening to a story like this, he'd grimace and shake his head as the details were described. He'd ask some clarifying questions with an expression of concern, head tilted. At the end of the story he'd look at the ground, imagining the experience of the engine crew - put into an impossible situation.
I found this one article during an exhaustive Google newspapers search on the term 'smoke' (combined with other terms I can't remember) for a previous post about Turcot Yard and urban coal smoke.
As people say about the algorithms ... perhaps the story found me.
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| from: The Independent; St Petersburg FL; 20 Nov 1941. Google Newspapers. |
For years I tried to collect paper artifacts. Then I spent years trying to find artifacts on the internet. During this research, I finally found virtually all the original references one could wish for.
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Newspaper Articles and an Official Report
Today's NTSB and Canadian TSB reports on transportation incidents look at 'all factors' ... including 'human factors', corporate culture and organizational behaviour ... when developing recommendations to make transportation systems safer.
Circa 1940, for relatively minor safety mishap statistics, US railroads provided monthly, sworn reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission. My 1909 (published annually) ICC book of all 'Railway Statistics' has 978 pages.
Given the seriousness of this accident, the details in the official report would have been compiled by federal investigators from the ICC who were experienced in railroad accident investigation. Through techniques like direct evidence collection at the locations involved, and sworn depositions taken from employees, management, and other participants, the concise analysis of the accident would have been developed.
The investigation was completed quickly. The short document does not resemble a modern NTSB study of 'all factors'.
Its conclusions follow the traditional railroad formula:
We have employees and you have prescribed rules and procedures to follow. In this case, you, the employee(s), failed to follow these simple rules and procedures.
It is reasonable to expect that many federal investigators were former professional railroaders with years of experience. Most of them probably believed that running railroads like para-military organizations was the most reliable way to ensure that rules were followed and that property and human life were protected.
The official report (to be discussed in the next post) provides solid details on the dates, times and the general sequence of events. The conclusions are certainly at odds with the initial newspaper information which presumably came mainly from company officials and employees.
For the participants and victims, this event began on 18 November 1941 at 2315hr when their train left Los Angeles Yard. Motive power was Cab-in-Front engine 4193 of the AC-8 class, delivered in 1939.
The engine below was from the AC-7 class, delivered in 1937, but it may be close enough to at least convey the massive size and power of the accident engine. In my own books, I have not found a photograph of the 4193. It did survive the accident to be repaired and returned to service.
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| The engine above is of the AC-7 Class, built 1937, shown on the Roseville, California turntable. from: Cab-In-Front; John B Hungerford; 1959; Hungerford Press. |
* * *
The Economic Circumstances
Although the attack on Pearl Harbor would occur three weeks later, formally bringing the United States into World War 2 ... the United States was already 'in the War' and California was in the midst of an industrial wartime boom.
Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King had opened the Thousand Islands Bridge on 18 August 1938 ... set up a joint continental defence system - The Ogdensburg Agreement, August 1940 ... Mackenzie King had served as the 'middleman' between British Prime Minister Churchill and Roosevelt for the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, September 1940,
... and The Hyde Park Declaration of 20 April 1941 had set up the template for cross-border industrial integration so that each country produced the wartime items it was best suited to provide. (Canada had been sending war materiel to Britain on credit ... and was paying cash if buying US inputs to make these items. Hyde Park solved Canada's impending financial crisis.)
In California, the industrial boom included: aircraft manufacturing, an emergency shipbuilding program, military base construction, a program to produce significant quantities of steel and aluminum, and coping with the arrival of 300,000 migrants from the southern US and the Dustbowl areas who were seeking employment in California.
... that was the economic environment when this accident occurred.
* * *
Employee Timetable, Map, the Railroad Environment ...
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| from: The employee timetable collection of the California State Railroad Museum, Sacramento. archive.org https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001478/mode/1up |
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| screencaps from: Southern Pacific employee timetable 183, Los Angeles Division, 8 July 1945. archive.org https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001553/page/n19/mode/1up |
The map above shows the route the train was taking from Los Angeles (bottom, right) to Santa Barbara (off this map segment, to the left) - 103 miles. Oxnard appears at the lower, left corner of that strange rectangle.
After leaving Los Angeles Yard, the train travelled via Burbank Junction, straight through Raymer, Chatsworth, and the accident took place in Tunnel 26, whose western portal is near the siding switch at Hasson.
The train had barely covered 30 miles when the tragedy unfolded.
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| from: Topographical Map, Santa Susan Quadrangle, edition of 1903. https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/topo/california/txu-pclmaps-topo-ca-santa_susana-1900.jpg |
This old and excellent map shows Tunnel 26 as 'Santa Susana Tunnel'.
Tunnels 27 and 28 (shorter, to the east) are shown.
These numbered tunnels appear in very small print on the timetable map (above) as well.
This 1903 map predates the siding named Hasson at the west portal of Tunnel 26.
* * *
From Google Earth come the following two images.
Top image is Tunnel 26 east portal, looking timetable west with a 1% grade. The Extra freight entered this tunnel, where its brakes went into emergency. Eventually it was recovered by pulling it backwards out of this portal.
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| If you've ever watched M*A*S*H ... the green mountain really looks like we're in 'Korea', eh? |
Bottom image is Tunnel 26 west portal looking timetable east. Hasson siding would have been off to the right. There is a siding a little farther west of this view today.
* * *
To Get Right to the Point ...
This figure comes from the official ICC report.
You are trapped within the centre of a mountain range, there is no one you can call.
Above is the 'profile' of Tunnel 26 which I have extracted from the 'graphics' page. The train was ascending a long 1% grade when the brakes applied. (If you're wondering, I think 34', 366' refers to the lengths of track used to transition from the 1% grade, to 'level', to the -0.1% grade.)
The 'point of accident' is the location of the engine (the centre dotted line and arrow). It is 3529 feet from the west portal. It is 3837 feet from the east portal. The tunnel is 7366 feet long and it is not ventilated in any way.
The engineer does not know this for certain, but the brakes are applied because of a broken knuckle. The break is 3469 feet behind the engine (the dotted line and arrow at the right). And the break is 368 feet inside the east portal of the tunnel.
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The 'Energy State' of the Motive Power
In preparation to ascend the grade, the fire and the boiler would be as hot as possible to obtain the most steam.
The firing plan would be to keep them hot to continue to produce steam ... as the train is dragged up the grade by the engine ... as hot steam and pressure is 'removed' during this process ... and as cooler feedwater is injected into the boiler.
Shortly after the train goes into emergency, and the engineer closes the throttle ... my guess is that the main safety valve is going to open. Boiler pressure design: 250 lb/sq inch, ~17 atmospheres. (Location: The safety valve is about 6 feet behind the cab.)
As we know from our recent 'oil-firing studies' ... if the oil firing valve is not shut ... at the same time that the throttle is closed (this throttle action stops the smokebox/stack suction which drafts the fire and draws fresh air into the firebox) ... a great deal of oily, black smoke will be created almost immediately. (Location: The stack is about 80 feet behind the cab.)
The coupling between the engine and the rest of the train is about 125 feet behind the cab doors.
The clearance between the top of the cab and the tunnel roof is about 4 feet.
The clearance between the cab wall and the tunnel wall is about 2.5 feet.
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What the Engine Crew Might Have Faced
As my imagined conversation about this 'ongoing situation' with Rolly continues, I think he is very concerned.
The engine cab and the tunnel would be a low light, enclosed environment. Quick-thinking leadership, clear communication ('crew resource management'), and decisive action is going to be necessary.
Only having the 'widest possible perspective' in this situation can avert disaster.
At this point in history, even in aviation, hypoxia's impact on judgement was not universally understood and 'respected/feared'.
The combined effects of ... scalding steam accompanied by deafening noise ... blinding smoke creating unbreathable air ... extreme heat ... and the rapid onset of hypoxia ... leaves the engine crew only one single option if they choose to stay with the engine.
* * *
The Employee Timetable on that date ...
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| from: The employee timetable collection of the California State Railroad Museum, Sacramento. archive.org https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001478/mode/1up |
Random timetable samples I checked from the years before and after the accident ... often showed scheduled westbound freights, Los Angeles to Santa Barbara. However, I think the wartime demands involved running so many scheduled passenger trains (perhaps sometimes in sections) that Extra freights were preferred for scheduling flexibility - rather than putting them in the schedule.
Westbound Train 75, Lark is a First Class train following the same route (at least from Burbank Jct to Santa Barbara) as the extra freight which is the subject of this story.
I've been through all of the timetable notes ... WEST is the SUPERIOR DIRECTION.
An Automatic Block System (ABS) maintains safe train 'separation'. Traffic control is by the timetable and train orders.
You'll find there are some really nice aspects to the layout of, and the additional railroad information in, these SP timetables.
The eastbound schedule sheet is included because it alone includes essential data, such as the siding capacities (these are calculated using a 49-foot average car length) and the official subdivision mileage - numbered from San Francisco.
Hasson is at mileage 441.0
On this timetable Santa Susana is a 'station' as defined in the rules (i.e. a place named in the timetable).
The tunnel is not at Santa Susana and is simply named Tunnel 26 in the notes.
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| from: The employee timetable collection of the California State Railroad Museum, Sacramento. archive.org https://archive.org/details/cscrm_2021_02_001478/mode/1up |
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Newspaper Accounts of the Accident
The Oxnard Press-Courier was an evening paper, published daily except Sundays in 1941. It is the 'local newspaper'. Unfortunately, the microfilming job was done really poorly on this important, local front page banner story. Versions of this story were picked up across the US and I've found a good detailed account in the Montreal Gazette (following below). About 80% of the newspaper articles I read are not included in this post.
Give yourself 10 bonus points if you try to read any of this first article!
The Reporter At Train Wreck story (also starting on Page 1 of that day's newspaper) which follows is a very good summary of what was generally understood about the accident inside Tunnel 26 - which had occurred about 14-16 hours earlier.
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Reporter at Wreck
19 November 1941
This article began on the front page with most of it printed inside the paper. I have arranged the various columns into the block below.
(There are so many columns in this post that I haven't done the usual work of trying to vertically straighten them.)
In the article, the 'north' end of the tunnel corresponds to west on the compass and west in the employee timetable. In the article, it is referred to as the 'Santa Susana end' of the train/tunnel - the west end.
The engine was on the west end of the train, in the centre of the tunnel.
The tailend of the train was on the east - Chatsworth - end of the train. That night, the coupler knuckle had been broken between the 74th and 75th cars of the 96-car train.
In fact, the knuckle had been repaired almost immediately by the tailend crew without any loss of life.
... So, hours later, during the 'recovery operation' at the relatively 'cool' east end of the tunnel, it would have been possible to re-couple the 96-car train consist, release some or all of the train brakes, and pull the train backwards from the tunnel. The independent brake of the engine was found to be on, so the engine itself would have resisted this operation somewhat. (This recovery movement was mostly descending a 1% grade.)
Again, the engine had stopped 3500 feet from the west end of the tunnel and this will partly explain the difficulty in reaching it with a firehose.
* * *
A story taken from the Associated Press wire and published on November 20 in Florida.
Many of the facts quoted and presented to the press by the railroad will be contradicted in the final Interstate Commerce Commission report - filed in Washington on 20 January 1942 - nine weeks later. (Two significant factual errors appear in the article below.)
There were two firemen and one headend brakeman on this train. In the caboose were the conductor, a tailend brakeman and another brakeman who would have served as flagman, if needed.
- If you have a look at the Beaumont Subdivision on Page 5 of the employee timetable ... and check Page 13 to read Rule 869 ... you'll see that ALL brakeman (except the flagman) "must ride on top of train", Beaumont to Edom (37 miles, eastbound) and Beaumont to Colton (23 miles, westbound).
- It continues that brakeman must not ride on the tops of cars through Tunnel 26, between Hasson and Chatsworth.
- There are also notes about Tunnels 26-28 on the lower left corner of Page 18. 'It is dangerous to ride on tops or sides of cars'.
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| from: 20 Nov 1941, The Independent, St Petersburg, Florida. Google newspapers. |
... The rerouted trains would have gone via the more undulating, original, slower, longer route via Saugus (to the north).
Sensitivity warning: There is no depiction of human remains I can see or discern in the included AP Wirephoto below ...
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| from: 20 Nov 1941, Youngstown Daily Vindicator. Google newspapers. |
Historically, the photo is interesting because it evokes the black-and-white 'California film noir style' of the 1940s and 1950s. Officials, wearing hats and smoking cigarettes grimly look down upon a deceased victim. Beyond the people, I think the photo also shows a long cut of ice refrigerator cars with their hatches open.
* * *
Here is the Gazette article.
It gives the ages of almost all crew members,
so we can better imagine who was present,
and how much experience they might have had as railroaders.
Not the Gazette's fault:
- The location of the tailend brakeman's (CE Baker) body is incorrect (wrong end of the tunnel).
- The time of the knuckle repair is incorrect.
- I think the lack of oxygen is what made the gas masks ineffective.
- The reason for Baker's death can be inferred for the first time from this article.
Of course, these events occurred long before the common availability of end-to-end portable radio communication.
Signals from the caboose to the headend were communicated by kerosene lanterns, rarely: early battery lanterns, or fusees. Even with Tunnel 26's straight bore, it seems really unlikely that signalling from tailend to headend could have been possible.
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| from: 20 Nov 1941; Montreal Gazette. Google newspapers. |
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| from: Chatsworth Railroad History; 2020; Chatsworth Historical Society. The link below will download the booklet if you're interested ... https://www.chatsworthhistory.com/Program%20Downloads/Chatsworth%20Railroad%20History.pdf |
The image above is a screencap from the PDF. If you've been following this series of posts, the booklet illustrates the local railroad history really well, with original photos of the tunnel construction, the mile-long Santa Monica pier (aka 'Los Angeles'), etc.
My best guess - based on topography - is that this photo shows the west end of the tunnel.
"... giant wind machines from movie studios finally were pressed into service." from: The Register-Guard, Eugene, Oregon, 19 November 1941.
This photo may or may not capture the clearing of smoke by using those fans.